In Gödel fuzzy propositional logic, neither conjunction nor implication is expressible (definable) in terms of the remaining three logical connectives.
A common way to construct a Hilbert (or Frege) style calculus for the logic G is to take a Hilbert calculus for intuitionistic propositional logic (e.g. the version from [7] with eight axiom schemes and modus ponens) and to enrich it with the prelinearity scheme (A→B)∨(B→A). Let us denote the resulting calculus again by the letter G. The fact that the calculus G is complete w.r.t. the standard G-algebra was proved by M. Dummett in [4] ; the logic G is sometimes also called Dummett logic.
A semantics for intuitionistic logic can be defined using Kripke models. A Kripke frame for intuitionistic logic is a structure W, R where R is an ordering on a (nonempty) set W . The relation R is called an accessibility relation of the frame W, R . A Kripke model for intuitionistic logic is a triple W, R, − such that W, R is a Kripke frame and − (a forcing relation) is a relation between elements of W and propositional formulas satisfying the following conditions for all x, y ∈ W , all propositional formulas A and B and all propositional atoms p:
The first condition is called a persistency condition. This condition is easily shown to be true for all formulas, not just atoms. A Kripke model W, R, − is a counter-model for a formula A if x − / A for some x ∈ W . A formula A is an intuitionistic tautology if it has no counter-model. For more about Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic see e.g. [3] .
The following definition and lemma show that Kripke models can be useful also in connection with Gödel fuzzy logic. A Kripke frame W, R is connected if x R y or y R x whenever there is a z such that z R x and z R y. Otherwise speaking, W, R is connected if the set of all elements of W accessible from any z is linearly ordered. The above argument shows that the logic G is complete w.r.t. the class of all (finite) linearly ordered Kripke models. For our purposes, however, this argument is somewhat misleading because it may suggest that (connected) Kripke models which are not linearly ordered are useless when thinking about the logic G. Indeed they are useless for the purpose of showing that a given formula is not a G-tautology. But our point is to show that they may be useful for other purposes.
Lemma 1 The Gödel fuzzy logic G is sound w.r.t. the class of all Kripke models W, R, − whose frame W, R is connected.
Let
for some formula A. Sometimes we shall write only D(A) instead of D K (A). Note that any definable set X is upwards closed, i.e. y ∈ X whenever x ∈ X and x ≤ y.
Proof Obvious.
Theorem 1 The formula p&q is not G-equivalent to any formula built up from p and q using only →, ∨ and ¬. The formula p → q is not G-equivalent to any formula built up from p and q using only &, ∨ and ¬. Thus, in the logic G, neither conjunction nor implication is expressible in terms of the remaining three logical connectives.
Proof Consider the Kripke model in the left of Fig. 1. Its domain is {a, b, c}.  Besides the pair [a, b] indicated by an arrow, its accessibility relation contains also three non-indicated elements [a, a], [b, b], and [c, c] . The model is connected. The atom p defines the set {a, b} and the atom q defines the set {b, c}. The formula p&q defines the set {b}. Similar argument shows that, in the model on the right hand side of Fig. 1 , the formula p → q defines the set {b, c} while no formula not containing implication can define the same set. QED
We close the paper with some remarks. First, the fact that in intuitionistic logic conjunction and implication is not expressible in terms of the remaining connectives is known for a long time and is thoroughly elaborated e.g. in [2] . The models in Fig. 1 are, with some modifications, taken from [2] . These models work also for intuitionistic logic.
Second, the question whether conjunction or implication is G-expressible in terms of the remaining connectives was raised in [1] , where a partial result was proved: in G, conjunction is not expressible using only implication and negation.
Third, using the method of definable sets in Kripke models one can show that in intuitionistic logic disjunction in not expressible in terms of the remaining connectives. On the other hand, in Gödel fuzzy logic disjunction is expressible in terms of conjunction and implication, see [1] .
Our fourth and final remark is for readers who prefer thinking about truth values to thinking about Kripke models. With any Kripke model W, R, − , a Heyting algebra H is naturally associated: the domain H of H are the definable subsets of W , the extremal truth values 1 H and 0 H are W and ∅ respectively, and the operations of H are ∪, ∩ and the residuum function ⇒ defined by X ⇒ Y = { Z ∈ H ; Z ∩ X ⊆ Y }. For example, the left model in Fig. 1 has six definable sets, namely {a, b, c}, {a, b}, {b, c}, {b}, {c} and ∅ (exercise: which formula defines the set {c}?). A Heyting algebra H = H, ∧, ∨, ⇒, 0, 1 is said
